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The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: 
Legislative Choice and Judicial Review 
Rex E. Lee* 
The Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith1 has generated a signifcant volume of 
scholarly ~riticism.~ This is not surprising considering the 
fundamental change it worked on our understanding of the 
Free Exercise Clause. Prior to  Smith the prevailing view was 
that the Free Exercise Clause required the government to show 
a compelling state interest to justify an intrusion on religious 
freed~m.~ But in Smith, the Court held that so long as the law 
is generally applicable-in other words, not aimed specifically 
at religion-government may regulate religious activity so long 
as the governmental interest is legitimate.' 
In response to Smith, members of Congress proposed the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.5 Now in its third attempt, 
* President, Brigham Young University; George Sutherland Professor of Law, 
J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University; Former Solicitor General 
of the United States (1981-85); Former Assistant United States Attorney General, 
Civil Division (1975-77). This article was adapted from a speech originally given at  
a Bill of Rights symposium jointly sponsored by the Brigham Young University 
Law School Alumni Association and the J. Reuben Clark Law Society. 
1. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
2. For a listing of some of the scholarly criticisms of Smith, see James E. 
Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 
78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1409 n.15 (1992); The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: 
Hearing on S. 2969 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 60 (1992) (statement of Oliver S. Thomas, app. IV). 
3. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894-97 (O'Co~or,  J., concurring in the judgment); see 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 
406-07 (1963). 
4. Smith, 494 U.S. at  878. 
5. H.R. 5377 & S. 3254, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). Neither version of the 
original bill passed the lOlst Congress. The bill was subsequently reintroduced as 
H.R. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 2969, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), and 
met a similar fate. The bill has again been reintroduced in both the House and 
the Senate. H.R. 1308 & S. 578, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill passed the 
House on May 11, 1993, 139 CONG. REC. H2356-63 (daily ed. May 11, 1993), and 
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the Act stands an excellent chance of passing, given its growing 
bipartisan ~ u p p o r t . ~  The potential interaction between the 
language of the Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, 
however, represents one of the most interesting and important 
dynamics currently at work in American constitutional law. 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act would require states to 
provide religious exemptions from generally applicable laws 
unless doing so would defeat a compelling state interest. Quite 
simply, the Act proposes to mandate religious accommodation 
that  the  Supreme Court has determined to be not 
constitutionally required. 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act should be adopted. 
I t  would certainly represent an improvement over the present 
state of the law, but it raises questions concerning the scope of 
the legislative power. This article explores the interaction 
between the Supreme Court's power of judicial review and the 
Congress's law-making authority in  the context of the post- 
incorporation Free Exercise Clause. 
11. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN JUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
LEGISLAW POLICY MAKING 
Those who wrote the Constitution clearly intended the 
judiciary to be the final interpreter of all laws, including the 
Constitution. The best historical insight into those views is 
contained in The Federalist No. 78, in which Alexander 
Hamilton wrote: 
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the 
constitutional judges of their own powers and that the 
construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other 
departments it may be answered that this cannot be the 
natural presumption. . . . I t  is far more rational to suppose 
that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body 
between the people and the legislature in order, among other 
things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their 
authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and 
peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and 
it was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 6, 1993 by a vote of 
15 to 1, 139 CONG. REC. D472 (daily ed. May 6, 1993); Adam Clymer, Congress 
Moves to Ease Curb on Religious Acts, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1993, at A9. 
6. See 139 CONG. REC. S2822 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1993) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy); id. at 52823 (letter from Pres. Clinton); id. at S2824 (statement of Sen. 
Hatch). 
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must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. I t  
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning a s  well as  
the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the 
legislative body.' 
No historical argument of equal dignity looks the other way. 
Even the Anti-Federalists, though opposed to the concept of 
judicial review, recognized that the Constitution provided for 
its exercise by the ~ o u r t s . ~  
As a policy matter, it makes eminently good sense that the 
judiciary should be the ultimate guardian of constitutional 
rights and declarant of their meaning. Constitutional rights 
are, by their nature, minority  right^.^ The principal role of the 
Constitution, in this sense, is to protect these rights by limiting 
the acts of the two political branches, which by definition 
represent the majority. Precisely because these branches are 
political, and thus responsive to the majority, it is appropriate 
that the constitutional review of laws and other rules governing 
our society that emanate from the political branches should 
come from the judiciary-the only branch of government not 
directly answerable to the majority. 
The great risk inherent in this arrangement is, of course, 
that under the guise of interpretation, the judiciary will engage 
in a great deal of policy making. The potential for such 
mischief is exacerbated by the reality that the most important 
provisions of the United States Constitution, as well as the 
majority of the statutes reviewed by the Court, are broadly 
phrased and ambiguous. Nevertheless, the exercise of the very 
proper judicial prerogative to interpret the law, and 
particularly to determine its constitutionality, necessarily 
involves a substantial amount of law making-especially since 
law making is, in the final analysis, a choice among policy 
alternatives. I will explain why this is true. 
7. THE FEDERAUST NO. 78, at  467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). Hamilton's statement is supported by several statements made during the 
constitutional convention explicitly or implicitly recognizing the power of judicial 
review. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, at 61, 305, 351, 518, 539 (Norton ed. 1987) (1840). 
8. The Anti-Federalist position was not that Hamilton was wrong about the 
judiciary's role under the new Constitution, but that judicial review was not a good 
idea. See, e.g., Essays of Brutus XI-XV, reprinted in 2 HERBERT J. STORING, THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 417-42 (Murray Dry ed. 1981). 
9. The term "minority rights" in this context refers not specifically to ethnic or 
racial minorities, but to any political minority. 
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Challenges to governmental acts are usually brought by 
individuals who contend that a particular statute or regulation 
violates their constitutional rights. Accordingly, judicial review 
is customarily thought to  be a process of balancing two 
competing sets of interests: those of the government and those 
of the individual. The judicial task, it follows, is to determine 
whether the individual interest is constitutionally protected, 
thus requiring the governmental interest to  yield. 
This view is deficient because it overlooks one important 
feature of the overall governmental process. In the 
overwhelming majority of cases, the governmental interest that 
conflicts with the individual interest involves nothing more nor 
less than a legislative preference of one private, individual 
interest over another. Consider, for example, Williamson v. Lee 
Optical,l0 in which a group of opticians challenged an 
Oklahoma statute that restricted the rendering of certain eye- 
care services to  licensed ophthalmologists and optometrists. 
Under the traditional view, Williamson would be characterized 
as a case involving a conflict between the state's interest in 
ensuring high quality eye care and the individual interest of 
opticians in being allowed to  perform the restricted eye-care 
services. But this is not an accurate characterization. The 
public policy reflected in the Oklahoma statute represented no 
more than a legislative decision that the public interest is 
better served by preferring the interests of one private group, 
the more highly trained ophthalmologists and optometrists, 
over those of another, the opticians. The imprimatur of state 
interest was not attached until after the legislature, as 
required by o u r  system of government, weighed the competing 
private interests and made a decision. It was only then that 
one of the competing private interests became governmental. 
As the Court explained, "The Oklahoma law may exact a 
needless, wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for the 
legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and 
disadvantages  of the  new requirement."" Line 
drawingdeciding which of two competing interests better 
serves the public interest-is the essence of law making. It is 
what legislatures do best; it is what they are institutionally 
and structurally capable of doing better than any other branch 
of government. 
10. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
11. Id. at 487. 
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In Williamson, the Court left the legislative judgment 
intact. In Zablocki u. ~ e d h a i l ' ~  it did not. Instead, the 
Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin statute that required 
persons with existing child support obligations to demonstrate 
their ability to meet those obligations before they could 
marry.13 Under the traditional view, judicial review of this 
statute would be described as a balance of two competing sets 
of interests: the government's interest in assuring that children 
are cared for, and the private interest of those who want to  
marry. 
Once again the traditional view is wrong. And it is wrong 
in ways that affect our thinking about the respective roles of 
legislatures and courts. In our system, government has no 
internal self-interest; it exists to  serve the needs of the 
people.14 The traditional view is wrong because it considers 
the competing sets of interests only at the stage where they 
come into court, after the government, in the form of the 
legislature, has already considered those interests and made a 
choice between them. But at the very first stage, in Zablocki as 
in Williamson and most cases, the choice made by the 
legislature is a choice between two sets of competing private 
interests. The reason that the competing interests can be 
neatly classified as governmental or individual at the judicial 
stage is that the legislature has already addressed the issues, 
made its choice, and placed the imprimatur of public interest 
on one side of the controversy. 
In Zablocki, one of the private interests was the interest in 
marrying-in pursuing one's life as a member of a traditional 
family unit. The group of individuals who share that interest 
are adults-parents and prospective marriage partners. The 
competing interests are those of children in assuring that their 
basic needs for survival and sustenance will not be disregarded 
by those who brought them into the world. It is simply wrong, 
therefore, t o  say that the competing interests in Zablocki were 
those of the State of Wisconsin on the one hand and those of 
12. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
13. Id. at 375, 388-91. 
14. The preamble to the United States Constitution provides that the purpose 
of government is to "form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and 
secure the Blessings of Liberty." U.S. CONST. pmbl. The purpose of state 
governments is basically the same. See, e.g., UTAH CONST. art. I, $9 1-2; VA. 
CONST. art. I, $ 3; WASH. CONST. art. I, $ 1. 
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individuals like Mr. Redhail on the other. At the legislative 
stage both interests were individual interests. When the 
legislature made its choice, the individual nature of the 
preferred interest did not disappear. 
The only accurate way to describe the task facing the 
judiciary, therefore, is that it involves an accommodation 
between two groups of individuals, one of whom the legislature 
has already decided has the best side of the argument. 
Obviously, this does not mean that legislative policy choices 
should never be disturbed by the courts. Judicial review is just 
as much a cornerstone of our separation of powers, and indeed 
our total constitutional structure, as is the legislative policy- 
making prerogative. The solution lies in reaching an 
accommodation between the two branches and the inherent 
overlap between their two core functions: policy making by the 
legislature, and constitutional law making by the judiciary, 
which inevitably involves overturning at least some of the 
legislature's policy judgments. 
111. STANDARDS FOR JUDICIAL  VIEW 
The proper approach to judicial review must begin with an 
attitude of deference toward the legislature and a consequent 
reluctance to rule against constitutionality. This general view 
is motivated in part by basic feelings about democracy, and in 
part by theoretical and practical considerations of what the 
relationship should be between coordinate branches of 
government, including whether the residual power to make law 
ought to reside in the legislature or in the co~rts. '~ 
This deferential standard of review, which is followed in 
15. The legislature is, after all, a coordinate branch of government with 
independent authority to interpret the Constitution within its own sphere of 
responsibility. The fad that "[ilt is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), does not mean that Congress must take a subservient 
position to the Court. As Professor Wechsler has reminded us: 
Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, do not pass on 
constitutional questions because there is a special function vested in them 
to enforce the Constitution or police the other agencies of government. 
They do so rather for the reason that they must decide a litigated issue 
that is otherwise within their jurisdiction and in doing so must give effect 
to the supreme law of the land. That is, at least, what Marbury v. 
Madison was all about. 
Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1006 
(1965) (footnote omitted). 
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the majority of cases, is usually called rational basis review. 
Like other standards employed by the Court, it has two 
principal, and related focal points. The first concerns the 
importance of the governmental interest that must be shown, 
and the second, the degree of likelihood that the statute at  
issue will in fact achieve that governmental objective. In its 
traditional applications, the rational basis approach favors the 
government on both of these inquiries: the governmental 
interest is acceptable so long as it falls within the legitimate 
scope of government's power to act, ahd the "fit" between 
means and end will be found acceptable so long as there is a 
reasonable possibility that what government has done will in 
fact achieve its legitimate objective? Not surprisingly, in the 
great majority of cases in which the rational basis test is 
applied, the government emerges victorious. 
Over the course of our history, considerable attention has 
focused on the question of which categories of cases ought to 
qualify for an exception to  the rational basis approach. The 
Constitution says nothing explicitly about categories of 
"preferred" rights entitled to  higher levels of scrutiny, and over 
the years the courts have struggled with the question of 
whether there should be such preferred, heightened scrutiny 
categories, and if so, what they should be. 
In my view, the strongest candidates for preferred, 
fundamental right status are those rights that quite clearly, 
either from the constitutional text or its history, were the 
central concern underlying the adoption of a particular 
provision. Obvious examples include (1) the First Amendment's 
freedom from prior restraints, (2) the Fourteenth Amendment's 
prohibition of state-sponsored racial discrimination, and (3) the 
Commerce Clause's guarantee that a state may not prefer its 
own economic interests over those of another state. In fact, 
however, preferred status has been extended far beyond these 
concerns or even those rights explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution's text, to the point that it is impossible to  draw a 
rational dividing line between rights that are afforded a 
preferred status and rights that are not. Indeed, many rights 
declared fundamental by the Supreme Court are not even 
mentioned in the Constitution. 
16. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). See 
generally GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 608-12 (12th ed. 1991) 
(discussing rational basis scrutiny). 
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Starting about a hundred years ago, with Lochner u. New 
York," and continuing for the next four decades, the cases on 
which the constitutional searchlight consistently shone most 
brightly were those in which the government deprived 
individuals and corporations of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law. The Court's concern was not with 
procedural defects in the regulations, but rather with their 
substan~e.'~ In most cases, these were economic regulation 
cases, but in at least two famous instances, Meyer u. 
~ e b r a s k a ' ~  and Pierce u. Society of Sisters:' non-economic 
rights were involved. This so-called Lochner era of substantive 
due process came to an end with Nebbia u. New York2' and 
West Coast Hotel u. Parrish?' not because the Supreme Court 
declared that the Due Process Clause had no substantive 
component, but simply because the Court changed the standard 
of review from heightened scrutiny to a highly deferential 
application of rational basis 
Over the decades since that time, beginning as early as 
1942 with Skinner u. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson? and 
reaching full flower within the last three decades, the Court 
has now rather firmly established that it will afford heightened 
or strid scrutiny where the law under review either contains a 
suspect classification or impacts a fundamental right.25 
The standard for reviewing these cases provides an 
interesting comparison to the rational basis test. Both tests 
inquire into the strength of the governmental interest and the 
17. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
18. E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1915); Adair v. United States, 
208 U.S. 161, 172-73 (1908). 
19. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating state law prohibiting the teaching of 
foreign languages in the schools). 
20. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating state law requiring students to attend 
public schools). 
21. 291 US. 502 (1934). 
22. 300 US. 379 (1937). 
23. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 525 (holding that legislation need only bear a 
substantial relationship to its underlying purpose); West Coast, 300 U.S. at 391 
(holding that a regulation is constitutional if it is reasonably related to a 
community interest). Later cases were even more deferential. See Ferguson v. 
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-32 (1963) (rational basis); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 
348 U.S. 483, 487-91 (1955) (same). 
24. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
25. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-93 (1969) (suspect class); 
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964) (same); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
152-56 (1973) (fundamental rights); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-68 (1964) 
(same). 
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tightness of the fit between means and end. But where a 
suspect classification or a fundamental right is involved, the 
requirements for both components of the test are considerably 
more stringent. The governmental interest must be compelling, 
not merely legitimate and reasonable, and the statute must be 
narrowly tailored or necessary to achieve the relevant 
compelling state intere~t. '~ The mere possibility, or even 
probability, that the law will in fact achieve its objective is not 
sufficient. This second requirement, dealing with the means- 
end relationship applicable to fundamental rights cases, is 
sometimes expressed another way-that government must 
employ the least burdensome alternative." This is not 
identical to the "narrowly tailored" requirement; it is even more 
restrictive, because in essence what it says is that the chosen 
governmental means is unconstitutional so long as there is 
some other less burdensome way that government could have 
achieved the same resukZ8 
To be sure, this brief summary is somewhat oversimplified. 
On the rational basis end, the courts have sometimes found 
ways to apply what some have referred to as rational basis 
"with bite"29 either by requiring a tighter fit between means 
and end:' or -by ascribing an improper motive to the 
legi~lature.~' And at  the other end, the Court has sometimes 
shown a proclivity to find some governmental objectives to be 
compelling." But whatever give there may be at either end on 
either of these two tests, there is little doubt that in  theory, 
and almost always in practice, they are poles apart. 
The critical questions then are (1) Which rights are 
26. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984). See generally GUNTHER, 
supm note 16, at 642 n.2 (discussing the various verbal formulations of strict 
scrutiny). 
27. DUM V. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 
479, 488-90 (1960). 
28. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798-99 (1989). 
29. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-37 (1972); see also GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 449 & n.9. 
30. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-53 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971). 
31. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342-45 (1960). 
32. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1982) (social security); 
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461-62 (1971) (military conscription); 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-19 (1944) (prevention of espionage 
and sabotage). 
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included within the class of rights determined to  be 
fundamental? and (2) Which bases for classification are 
considered to be suspect? These questions are important 
because not only do the answers determine the intensity of the 
constitutional review, but in most cases they determine the 
substantive outcome as well. Unfortunately, the Court's 
answers have been far from satisfactory. 
With regard to the first question, in at least one case, Sun 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrigue~,~~ the
Supreme Court has said that fundamental rights are those 
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. The 
problem with this statement is that it does not, in fact, describe 
what the Supreme Court has done.34 As the dissent in 
Rodriguez points out so persuasively, several rights 
traditionally held to be fundamental-the right to vote in state 
elections,35 the right to marry and procreateP6 and the right 
to appeal a criminal conviction3'-are neither explicitly nor 
implicitly guaranteed by the Consti t~tion.~~ Additional 
examples of so-called implied fundamental rights include the 
right to travePg and the right of privacy.40 
The second question, concerning which classifications 
qualify as suspect, has not been addressed in a consistent 
fashion." The Court has consistently held that classifications 
33. 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). 
34. In at least one scholar's view, the Rodriguez dichotomy between textual and 
nontextual rights is no longer followed by the Court. Dennis J. Hutchinson, More 
Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 167, 
192 (Subsequent cases "demonstrate that Rodriguez is now a constitutional relic."). 
But see GEOFFREY R. STONE AL., C O N S T ~ I O N A L  LAW 900 (2d ed. 1991) ("Since 
1973 the Court has generally adhered to the Rodriguez reformulation."). 
Interestingly, both Hutchinson and Stone are members of the same law faculty. 
35. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964); see also Yick Wo v. 
Hopbins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
36. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see also 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978). 
37. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-19 (1956). 
38. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. a t  100 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
39. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US. 618, 629-31 (1969). 
40. Griswold v. Co~ecticut ,  381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973). After the Court's recent decision in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), it is unclear whether the right of privacy, at least 
in the context of abortion, has retained its fundamental status. Id. at  2804-08; id 
at  2860 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
41. The Court's decision in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 
144 (1938), though ostensibly a decision cutting back on the number of cases 
qualifying for heightened scrutiny, left a loophole that has become the basis of 
much of the modern suspect classification debate. In his famous footnote four, 
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based on race are inherently suspect and thus must be strictly 
~crutinized.~~ Beyond race, however, only three classifications 
have attracted any degree of heightened s~rutiny-gender,4~ 
alienage or national and illegitima~y.~~ However, 
none of these classifications currently evoke strict scrutiny 
across the and attempts to attract heightened 
scrutiny to classifxations based on age:' mental deficiencyf 
and poverty4' have failed. Thus, the only clear answer to  this 
question is that government may not draw distinctions based 
on race unless it can demonstrate that the distinction is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Not 
surprisingly, this is a very Micult, if not impossible, task. 
Justice Stone stated, 
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts 
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about 
repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting 
judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment than are most other types of legislation . . . . 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the 
review of statutes directed at  particular religious, or national, or racial 
minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may 
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, 
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 
Id. at  152 n.4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Court has been grappling 
with the answer to this question ever since. 
42. E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984); Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 US. 214, 216 (1944); see also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 
(1880). 
43. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 69-72 (1981); Michael M. v. Superior 
Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1981); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976); 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 41 1 U.S. 677, 682 -88 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
44. Compare Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) ("[C]lassifications 
based on alienage are 'subject to close judicial scrutiny.'") and Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (same) with Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 
68, 72-75 (1979) ("[Ebrclusion of aliens from [certain] governmental positions would 
not invite as demanding scrutiny.") and Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294-97 
(1978) (same). 
45. Illegitimacy has never formally been labeled a suspect classification, 
GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 688, however classifications based on illegitimacy have 
attracted varying degrees of heightened scrutiny. E.g., Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 
1, 7-11 (1983); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968). 
46. See supra notes 4345; GUNTHER, supra note 16, a t  636-93. 
47. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976). 
48. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230-31 (1981). 
49. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 14142 (1971). 
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IV. FREE EXERCISE AND Employment Division v.  Smith 
The individual guarantees contained in the First 
Amendment, including the free exercise of religion, were among 
the first to be afforded fundamental right status.50 
This is as it should be if heightened scrutiny is to be 
extended to any guarantees beyond those that were, as 
discussed above,51 quite clearly the central concern underlying 
the adoption of a particular constitutional provision. As a 
textual guarantee, the fkee exercise of religion has a strong 
claim on heightened scrutiny. Accordingly, it had been the law, 
a t  least since Sherbert v. V e r n e ~ = , ~ ~  that the only 
constitutionally acceptable laws that inhibit the free exercise of 
religion are those that are narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling state interest. 
The most striking example of the potency of this rule in 
the Free Exercise Clause context is found in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder,s3 a case in which the Court held unconstitutional as 
applied to  members of the Amish faith a Wisconsin statute 
requiring all children to attend school up to  the age of sixteen. 
The legitimacy of the State's interest in assuring a minimally 
educated citizenry was obvious and conceded, as was the 
rationality of the relationship between the law at issue and the 
achievement of that objective. Clearly, the law would pass 
rational basis scrutiny with flying colors. But regardless of the 
strength of the governmental interest, and even assuming 
arguendo that it was compelling (which the Court did not), the 
State of Wisconsin had access to other, less burdensome means 
to achieve its objective. Accordingly, the statute failed the 
second half of the compelling state interest test. The fit 
between means and end was not ~ ~ c i e n t l y  tight. 
Despite the apparently established fundamental status of 
the free exercise right, the compelling interest test was 
50. See Cantwell v. Co~ecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("The fundamental 
concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties 
guaranteed by the First Amendment."); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 
(1937) ("[I]mmunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of 
the specific pledges of particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become 
valid as against the states." (footnote omitted)). 
51. See supra p. 79. 
52. 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963). 
53. 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). 
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abandoned in Employment Division v. SmithF4 which may be 
the most important free exercise case to be decided since 
Reynolds v. United States.55 Alfred Smith and his companion 
Galen Black were fired from their jobs as drug counselors 
because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes 
pursuant to their beliefs as members of the Native American 
The Supreme Court ruled that the denial of their 
claims for unemployment compensation did not offend the Free 
Exercise Clause. But that fact is not what put the opinion into 
the case books and the law reviews. As Justice O'Comor states 
in her concurrence, the Court could have easily affirmed the 
Oregon Supreme Court under the traditional compelling state 
interest standard, given the strength of the state's interest in 
controlling the use of drugs.57 Instead, the majority stunned 
nearly every student of constitutional law by announcing a 
quite different approach to the adjudication of free exercise 
cases: So long as the state's laws are generally applicable, so 
that religious practices are not singled out, they are not 
rendered unconstitutional because they idkinge on religious 
belief or pra~tice.~' 
54. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
55. 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (holding that general prohibition of polygamy did not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause). 
56. Just offhand, one would say that this is something drug counselors should 
not do. 
57. Smith, 494 U.S. at 903-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring). If, however, the state's 
interest is defined more narrowly as the interest in refusing to make an exception 
for the religious use of peyote, this argument becomes problematic because Oregon 
was not enforcing its drug laws with respect to the religious use of peyote at  the 
time. Id. at 909-11 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting). 
58. Id. at 878. According to Justice Scalia, 
It is no more necessary to regard the collection of a general tax, for 
example, as "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" by those citizens 
who believe support of organized government to be sinful, than it is to 
regard the same tax as "abridging the freedom . . . of the press" of those 
publishing companies that must pay the tax as a condition of staying in 
business. 
Id. This analogy is reminiscent of a rather cramped Hamiltonian view of the Bill 
of Rights. Hamilton, who opposed the Bill of Rights, contended that i t  could add 
no protections beyond those provided by the limited nature of the proposed federal 
government. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 512-15 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961). His thesis, that the limited government had no authority to act 
beyond its enumerated powers, led him to ask rhetorically, "Wlhy declare that 
things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should 
it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is 
given by which restrictions may be imposed?" Id. at 513-14. Hamilton's argument 
is based on a conception of a First Amendment that would protect individual 
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In all fairness, the Smith decision was not completely 
without precedent. As Justice Scalia pointed out, the Court has 
not always been completely consistent, even before Smith, in 
requiring that the laws be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest in religion cases.59 The case which 
irrefutably proves his point is Goldman v. Weinberger,60 which 
rejected the claim of an Orthodox Jewish Air Force officer that 
the Free Exercise Clause gave him a constitutional right to 
wear a yarmulke as part of his military attire, notwithstanding 
military regulations to the contrary. 
The Court, per Justice Rehnquist, determined ipse dixit 
that "review of military regulations challenged on First - 
Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional 
review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian 
~ociety."~' In other words, the compelling interest test did not 
apply. Exactly why such deference to the military was required 
in that case is unclear. About the strongest argument that can 
be made in support of the regulation is that it promotes the 
military's interest in uniformity of appearance. Although 
acceptable reasons exist for the military to want to have all of 
its officers look alike, it can certainly carry out its task of 
defending our shores while still permitting yarmulkes in the 
cockpit. To say that there is no less burdensome alternative 
would be nothing less than laughable. 
If the Smith approach survives, it will work some very 
large changes in existing free exercise jurisprudence. The 
liberties only against purposeful infringement, not against generally applicable 
legislation. Although Hamilton's conception of the Bill of Rights may have been 
acceptable in 1786, when the federal powers were construed narrowly, it is almost 
unthinkable in a modern society in which nearly every facet of life is subject to 
governmental regulation. It is also worth remembering that Hamilton's argument 
concerning the Bill of Rights was not persuasive even in his day. 
59. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-90. The scorecard does not suggest that free 
exercise plaintiffs have done very well, even under the compelling state interest 
test. See Ryan, supra note 2, at 1416-17, 1458-59 (In the Supreme Court, free 
exercise claims have lost in 13 out of 17 cases and in the circuit courts they have 
lost in 85 out of 97 cases.). Even so, the danger of Smith is that legislatures will 
no longer feel a need to provide religious exemptions that, though no longer 
required, are permissible. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 334-40 (1987). 
60. 475 U.S. 503 (1986). Other cases where the Court failed to apply the 
compelling state interest test include Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 
(1987); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
61. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507. 
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reason, quite simply, is that few laws that in fact inhibit the 
free exercise of religion are s p e ~ ~ c a l l y  aimed at religious 
practices. Certainly the South Carolina unemployment 
compensation laws involved in Sherbert or Wisconsin's 
compulsory education requirement in Yoder were not aimed at 
religious groups or religious practices. Both were quintessential 
general laws, generally applied. But as then Chief Justice 
Burger stated in Yoder, there are 
areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to 
control, even under regulations of general applicability . . . . 
. . . A regulation neutral on its face may, in its 
application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement 
for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free 
exercise of religion? 
It is quite clear, therefore, that the Smith test applied to the 
facts of either Sherbert or Yoder would have required a 
different result than that obtained in either of those cases. 
In an attempt to distinguish Yoder and other similar cases 
in which the compelling interest test had been applied, Justice 
Scalia noted that each case involved a hybrid of constitutional 
rights, a free exercise right combined with another 
constitutionally protected right which subjected the claim t o  
heightened scrutiny. This so-called hamburger-helper theory of 
constitutional laws3 is not an accurate description of those 
cases. Although each distinguished case did implicate another 
right afforded protection by the Court, a reading of Yoder and 
the other cases demonstrates that the free exercise right did 
not play second chair to the other right. In Yoder for example, 
the plus factor was the right of parents to direct the education 
of their children. Although the Court noted that "when the 
interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim 
of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a 
'reasonable relation to  some purpose within the competency of 
the State' is required to sustain the validity of the State's 
requirement under the First Amendment,'* the opinion also 
62. Yoder, 406 US. at 220, quoted in Smith, 494 US. at 896 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
63. James D. Gordon 111, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91, 
98 11.49 (1991). 
64. Yoder, 406 US. at 233. 
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concluded that the Free Exercise Clause (by itself) often 
requires exemptions to generally applicable law? 
Many of the concerns implicated in Free Exercise Clause 
cases may also be addressed by other constitutional 
guarantees, such as equal protection or free speech, but it does 
not follow that this overlap somehow relegates the Free 
Exercise Clause to a secondary status. Especially puzzling is 
the implication that the free exercise of religion, a textual 
right, needed to  be combined with the right of parents to  direct 
the education of their children, a nontextual, substantive due 
process right,B6 in order to attract strict scrutiny?' The first 
freedom of the First Amendment is the free exercise of religion, 
and nothing in the text, history, or previous judicial 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause suggests that this 
freedom must depend upon some other constitutional guarantee 
for protection. 
The attempted distinction of Sherbert is similarly 
unsatisfactory. Justice Scalia pointed out that recently the 
compelling state interest test had been applied only in 
unemployment compensation cases such as Sherbert. That does 
not provide ground for distinction because Smith, like Sherbert, 
was an unemployment compensation case. 
On June 11, 1993, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. u. City of Hialeah," the Supreme Court reaffirmed by 
dictum the basic rules of law laid down by the Smith case, 
though it held, on quite narrow grounds, that the church and 
its individual practitioners involved in that particular case 
were entitled to  free exercise protection. At issue was the 
constitutionality of ordinances enacted by the city of Hialeah 
prohibiting ritual animal sa~r i f ice .~~ 
The ordinances on their face did not single out any 
particular sect or group. The Court held, however, that despite 
their facial neutrality, the record in the case revealed the 
65. See supra text accompanying note 61. 
66. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213-14; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
534-35 (1925). 
67. At least one lower court has interpreted the hybrid-right theory to mean 
that the combination of two constitutional rights should trigger no greater scrutiny 
than would each right standing on its own. Salvation Army v. Department of 
Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 200 (3d Cir. 1990). In other words, the 
combination of free exercise and freedom of association would protect association 
for religious purposes only against purposeful discrimination. Id. 
68. 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). 
69. See Hialeah, Fla., Ordinance 87-72 (Sept. 22, 1987). 
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ordinances to have been directly aimed a t  the practices of a 
particular sect known as Santeria,7o whose membership 
consists principally of Caribbean immigrants to the United 
States and whose religious ceremonies include the ritual 
sacrifice of small animals, such as chickens, squirrels and cats. 
"Facial neutrality is not determinative," the Court said,71 and 
"[tlhe Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, 
extends beyond facial discrimination. The Clause 'forbids subtle 
departures from neutrality . . . .' "12 And though the city put 
forth legitimate governmental objectives on which the 
ordinances could be based, there were other means by which 
these objectives could have been achieved.73 
Because the Lukumi case was decided on religious 
neutrality grounds,74 statements in the various opinions 
concerning the continuing validity of Smith are necessarily 
dicta. Nevertheless, it is fairly apparent that the 5-4 majority, 
which in 1990 rejected the compelling state interest test in free 
. 
exercise cases involving statutes of general applicability, is now 
a 6-3 majority. Two of the four original dissenters, Justices 
Brennan and Marshall, have retired. Of their  two 
replacements, one agrees with Smith and one does not. Justice 
Souter, concurring in the judgment in Lukumi, is of the view 
that "the distinction Smith draws strikes me as ultimately 
~ntenable."'~ And Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion, 
which asserts that, "In addressing the constitutional protection 
for free exercise of religion, our cases establish the general 
proposition that a law that is neutral and of general 
applicability need not be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect 
of burdening a particular religious practice."76 Justices 
Blackmun and O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, adhere to 
the position "that Smith was wrongly decided, because it 
ignored the value of religious freedom as an affirmative 
individual liberty and treated the Free Exercise Clause as no 
70. See Petitioners' Brief passim, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993) (No. 91-948). 
71. Id. at 2227. 
72. Id. (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)). 
73. Id. at 2229-30. 
74. The Court also found the ordinances overbroad and underinclusive. Id. at 
2232-34. 
75. Id. at 2244 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
76. Id. at 2226 (citing Smith). 
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more than an antidiscrimination principle."77 
Thus, though all the statements are dicta, those 
statements leave little doubt that the Smith test now enjoys 
better health than it did three years ago, and the need for 
prompt passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is 
correspondingly "compelling." 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which was 
introduced in response to Smith, leaves little doubt about what 
it attempts to do. Section three provides: 
(a) Government shall not burden a person's exercise of 
religion even if the burden results from a, rule of general 
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b). 
(b) Government may burden a person's exercise of religion 
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the 
person- 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest." 
This is about as clear a statement of the compelling state 
interest test as can be found anywhere, and it creates a very 
interesting tension. On the one hand, the Supreme Court of the 
United States has interpreted the First Amendment to require 
only a fairly deferential standard of review whenever the law 
at issue is religiously neutral because it is generally applicable 
in both religious and non-religious contexts. Then, rather 
patently, Congress proposes a very different standard of review, 
and therefore a very different rule of constitutional law. Can 
the Congress of the United States simply lay down a 
completely different rule of constitutional law, and if so, has 
the core function of a coordinate branch of government been 
completely eviscerated? 
The source of authority for the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act is Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which gives Congress the power "to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article."7g The exact 
77. Id. at 2250 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
78. S. 578, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
79. U.S. CONST. amend. X I V ,  8 5. Each of the other Reconstruction 
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parameters of Congress's Fourteenth Amendment Section Five 
powers constitute one of the most complex and vexing areas of 
constitutional law, and one that quite clearly is yet to be 
resolved. The endpoints of that doctrine are fairly well fixed. 
On the one hand, Section Five does not create in Congress the 
blanket authority to overrule any constitutional decision by the 
Supreme Court, thereby effectively overruling Marbury v. 
Madison. But on the other hand, neither is it devoid of any 
meaning. At a minimum, it authorizes Congress to enact what 
the Court has sometimes referred to as "remedial" legislation, 
which effectively builds upon and strengthens already existing 
constitutional rights.80 About the only matter on which one 
can be confident in this regard is that if the bill becomes law, 
there will be a challenge to its constitutionality. 
The scope of the Section Five power was articulated over 
100 years ago in Ex parte Virginia: 
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry 
out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends 
to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to 
secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil 
rights and the equal protection of the laws against State 
denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the 
domain of congressional power.81 
This language substantially mirrors Chief Justice 
Marshall's description of the Necessary and Proper Clauses2 
in McCulloch v. M a r y l ~ n d . ~ ~  "Let the end be legitimate, let it 
be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which 
Amendments, Thirteen and Fifteen, has an identical enforcement clause. See id. 
amend. XIII, 5 2; id. amend. XV, 5 2. 
Other possible sources of authority include the Commerce Clause, id. art. I, 
5 8, cl. 3, and, if redrafkd, the General Welfare Clause, id. cl. 1, but Congress has 
not chosen to use these powers. If it had been utilized, the Commerce Clause 
would have been a possibility because many generally applicable laws infringing on 
the free exercise of religion affect interstate commerce. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. a t  
874 (employment compensation). Congress might also make the receipt of certain 
federal funds contingent upon the granting of religious exemptions from generally 
applicable law. Cf. The Equal Access Ad, 20 U.S.C. 5 4071 (1988) (requiring high 
schools receiving federal funds to allow religiously oriented student groups equal 
access to school facilities). 
80. Compare South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), with Lassiter 
v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
81. 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1880). 
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8, cl. 18. 
83. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
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are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to  that end, which 
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional." Chief Justice Marshall's 
language was used by the Court in South Carolina u. 
~ a t z e n b a c h ~ ~  as the test for determining the limit of 
Congress's enforcement power under Section Two of the 
Fifteenth Amend~nent?~ In that case the Court, under the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965,~~ upheld a suspension of literacy 
- 
testing in areas with less than fifty percent voter registration, 
even though the Court had previously held, in Lassiter v. 
Northampton County Board of ~lections,8' that literacy testing 
did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment.88 Another example 
of the breadth of the enforcement power is found in City of 
Rome v. United States:' in which the Court, applying 
McCulloch's appropriateness test, held that Congress could 
legislate to  prohibit voting schemes with discriminatory effects 
even though, according to  City of Mobile v. Bolden:' decided 
the same day, those schemes did not per se violate the 
Fifteenth Amendment." 
Both South Carolina v. Katzenbach and City of Rome 
suggest, at least by implication, that the enforcement powers of 
each of the reconstruction amendments are coe~tensive.~~ 
Since the language of each of the enforcement provisions is 
identical, no reason exists to believe that this implication is 
not, in fact, e~plicit.'~ 
In Katzenbach v. b organ:^ the Court decided a Voting 
Rights Act case under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
84. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
85. Id. at  326. This is entirely proper given that the Clause, by its text, 
applies to "all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
United States." U.S. CONST. art. I., $ 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added). 
86. 42 U.S.C. $ 1973 (1988). 
87. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
88. See Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional 
Rights, Can Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1059-60 (1993). 
89. 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
90. 446 US. 55, 65-74 (1980). 
91. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at  177; see Pawa supra note 88, a t  1059-62. 
92. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. a t  176-77, 179-80; Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at  326- 
27; Pawa, supra note 88, at  1059-62. 
93. City of Rome, 466 U.S. a t  207 n.1 @ehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe nature 
of the enforcement powers conferred by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
has always been treated as coextensive."). 
94. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
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Fourteenth Amendment. The State of New York required 
persons who had completed the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican 
school to pass a literacy test in order to vote. The enforcement 
of the testing requirement was prohibited by section 4(e) of the 
Voting Rights Act. The Court found this to  be a proper exercise 
of the Section Five enforcement powers even though in Lassiter 
it was determined that literacy tests are not necessarily 
prohibited by the Fourteenth or Fifkeenth Amendments. The 
Court held that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
"a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to 
exercise its discretion in determining whether and what 
legislation is needed to  secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment ."95 
Justice Breman, writing for the Court, gave two 
alternative rationales for section 4(e). The first, that Congress 
may have intended to increase the political power of Puerto 
R i c a n ~ , ~ ~  does not seem outlandish. However, the second 
rationale, that Congress may have determined on its own 
accord that the New York literacy tests violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause:' is truly remarkable, 
in that, if carried to its extreme, it shakes the foundations of 
the popular understanding of Marbury v. Madi~on.~' 
This second rationale, qualified by the notion that Section 
Five "does not grant Congress power to exercise discretion . . . 
'to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this 
Court,'"gg has become known popularly as the "ratchet 
theory."100 According to this theory, Congress may statutorily 
require more, but not less, protection of a constitutional right 
than the Constitution, as interpreted by the Court, would itself 
require. If that is in fact a correct statement of the law-a 
proposition which is not settled-then the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act would fit within congressional authority. The 
test for determining whether it is appropriate legislation to 
enforce the Free Exercise Clause would be, in the language of 
McCulloch v. Maryland, whether the legislation is "plainly 
adapted to that end" and whether the Act is "not prohibited, 
95. Id. at 651. 
96. Id. at 652-53. 
97. Id. at 652-54. 
98. But see supra note 15. 
99. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10 (quoting id. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
100. Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1230 (1978). 
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but consist[s] with the letter and spirit of the constitution."101 
The ratchet theory has never been expressly adopted by 
the Court. In Morgan it was one of two alternative rationales. 
However, it is fully consistent with the theory of constitutional 
jurisprudence since McCulloch. That is, the Constitution gives 
Congress broad powers to act within the scope of its broadly 
interpreted enumerated powers.lo2 In addition, numerous 
cases have reaffirmed Congress's authority to legislate beyond 
the Court's interpretations t o  enforce the Fourteenth 
A~nendment.''~ This power is equally broad when used to 
enforce the incorporated Bill of Rights? 
The enforcement power is not unlimited. It is subject to  
other express provisions of the Constitution,'" and it may 
not be used as a pretext to legislate on matters unrelated to  
the Fourteenth Amendment.lo6 However, none of these 
concerns appears to be implicated by the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act.''? The Constitution leaves no power 
expressly to the states to regulate religion, and after 
incorporation the Free Exercise Clause is directly related to the 
Fourteenth Amendment.lo8 
101. 17 US. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
102. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 US. 111 (1942) (Commerce Clause). 
103. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563-66 (1990); Patterson 
v. McLean Credit Union, 491 US. 164, 186-88 (1989); City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 US. 469, 490 (1989) (plurality opinion). See generally Douglas 
Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221. 
104. See Hutto v. F i ~ e y ,  437 U.S. 678, 693-99 (1978). But see id. at  717-18 
(Rehnqyist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress's power to enforce the Bill of 
Rights is not the same as its power to enforce the textual provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). See generally Pawa, supra note 88, at  1062-69. 
105. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118, 124-31 (1970). 
106. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 259-63 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
107. Paul Brest suggests another limitation on the Section Five power: "[Tlhe 
Fourteenth Amendment does not give Congress any greater power to contradict 
judicial doctrine than Congress has under any other part of the Constitution." Paul 
Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial 
Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 69 (1986). This limitation should pose no difficulty to 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Properly understood the Act does not 
attempt to contradict Smith's interpretation of the First Amendment, instead it 
provides a more effective enforcement mechanism for the free exercise of religion 
than that which the Court was willing to provide. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 890 (1990). Justice Scalia concludes his opinion in Smith by suggesting 
that the Court is not the proper branch of government to draw the lines in this 
area. Id. If the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is seen as a congressional 
acceptance of the invitation to "be solicitous of [the free exercise] value in its 
legislation," id., then no objection can be raised. 
108. Laycock, supra note 103, at 95. 
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The adoption of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
would represent an improvement in the present state of the 
law. Of all the rights that might qualify for preferred status, 
free exercise of religion should head the list. Within the present 
framework of constitutional law, the "generally applicable" 
standard simply does not afford sufficient protection for 
religious exercise, especially for smaller, politically powerless 
religions. Justice Scalia's description of this fact as an 
"unavoidable consequence of democratic govern~nent"'~~ is 
incredible in the context of the fundamental nature of First 
Amendment rights. Although many private interests are 
sacrificed as a price of living in  a civilized society, the free 
exercise of religion cannot be one of them. Free exercise has at 
least as great a claim to the protection of heightened scrutiny 
as any other right afforded such protection by the Court. 
The ultimate irony of the Court's new approach to the Free 
Exercise Clause is that, from a practical standpoint, racial 
minorities, normally afforded protection from discrimination in  
the suspect classifkation cases, are the very ones that have 
been denied the protection of the compelling state interest test 
in this fundamental rights context. In many of the Court's free 
exercise cases, even before Smith, the losing plaintiffs were 
members of a racial or ethnic minority.'1° Almost all of them 
are members of a religious minority-a potentially suspect 
class according to United States v. Carolene Products Co.'" 
Because larger religions are powerful enough to protect their 
concerns through the political process, generally applicable 
laws will rarely burden anything but the free exercise of 
minority religions. The reality of the post-Smith Free Exercise 
Clause may be that the compelling state interest test, still 
applicable in cases of purposeful discrimination, governs except 
in those cases where there is a suspect classification. From the 
standpoint of constitutional policy, giving those within a 
suspect class a lesser, rather than a greater, protection is the 
ultimate perversion. 
109. Smith, 494 US.  at 890. 
110. See Smith, 494 US. at 874 (Native Americans); Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (same); Goldman v. Weinberger, 
475 U.S. 503 (1986) (Jews); see a h  Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991); 
supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text. 
111. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The present state of free exercise jurisprudence is, to say 
the least, confused and unsettled. I t  simply cannot remain in 
its present state. Several possibilities exist for change. The 
change could come from Congress, if it has the constitutional 
authority. Or the Court itself could back away from Smith, and 
reinstitute compelling state interest and narrow tailoring as 
the governing standard. The Lukumi case suggests that this 
possibility is not imminent. A third possibility is that Smith, 
with its "anything-goes-so-long-as-the-laws-are-generally- 
applicable" standard, could become the governing law not only 
in free exercise cases, but all across the First Amendment 
spectr~m."~ A fourth possibility-though unfortunately not a 
likely one-is that the Court will recognize the wisdom of my 
own preferred view and establish deference to the political 
branches as the standard in all contexts except where it can be 
shown that the protection of a specific individual right was the 
motivating force behind the adoption of a particular provision 
of the constitution. The final possibility is that the end of the 
world will come. When that happens, all laws should be 
generally applicable. 
112. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2465-67 (1991) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (applying Smith's "generally applicable law" 
standard 'in the context of free expression). 
